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The safety of railway operation is influenced by the possibility of 
the occurrence of technical and human errors. For evaluating the 
human influence on safety, different approaches exist. One 
possibility is an analysis of accident descriptions from hazardous 
events. Within this method, the user can identify the underlying 
influential factors by analyzing the separate events. As a basis for 
the evaluation, all events appearing on a large network could be 
considered, the sample is very large. However, this must not lead to 
significant results, inevitably. Instead, it has to be questioned if a 
large railway network features different properties which may 
influence the occurrence of a human error. This could be 
infrastructural as well as operational parameters, for example. A 
change within one of the parameters could lead to a change of the 
error occurrence or rather a modified range of a specific 
performance shaping factor. In this case, the evaluation of a large 
network containing different properties would lead to insignificant 
results. Instead, it can make sense to choose a selection of the events 
that should be considered for the evaluation or rather to filter the 
events on specific parameters.  
The present article discusses the shift of contributing factors if 
different operational and infrastructural properties are assumed as a 
basis for the evaluation. 
Introduction 
In the development of innovations to enhance train drivers’ workplaces and 
operational procedures, it is important to evaluate their role in hazards appearing 
during railway operation. One possible approach is to conduct an analysis of 
accident descriptions from hazardous events which occurred within a specific 
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railway network in the past. For each failure scenario, e.g. the passing of a signal 
at danger (SPAD), data of the concrete events should allow the user to identify the 
underlying influential factors. After that, the probability that a specific factor leads 
to the hazardous situation can be calculated. 
Experience in this field has shown a wide range of operational and infrastructural 
constraints that may influence not only the quantity of events but also the set of 
performance shaping factors contributing to human errors. For getting significant 
results in any case, one possibility is to define a sample railway line with specific 
operational and infrastructural properties. In the further evaluation, only hazardous 
events whose operational and infrastructural background fits with the sample 
railway line are considered 
Evaluations have shown that it has to be discussed to which extent the probability 
of the occurrence of a hazardous event will change if operational constraints are 
modified, i.e. the properties of the sample railway line that were taken as a 
reference. For example, it can be expected that the numbers of errors based on 
perception will decrease if the allowed speed limit on a given railway line is 
lowered and all other factors remain constant.  
The variety of the operational constraints considered in the following chapters is 
derived from the typical operational modes and configurations of the German 
railway system. Different properties will be evaluated with respect to SPADs as 
one mostly occurring example of failure scenario. The evaluation takes the 
alteration potential and corresponding influence on the probability of this kind of 
hazardous event into account.  
In the paper, the question about getting insignificant results if doing the evaluation 
without filtering the events for specific constraints will be discussed in a 
qualitative scope as well as if it is possible to transfer results that are based on a 
sample railway line to an infrastructure or rather railway system featuring different 
properties. Based on long-year experience, examples of different infrastructural 
and operational parameters will be identified and evaluated. It will also be 
discussed, if a change of the parameters could lead to a modification of the range 
of a performance shaping factor’s occurrence. This can accompany a change of 
the probability of hazardous events. The qualitative evaluation may serve as a basis 
for a subsequent quantitative analysis, not only for the network of the German 
railways but also for transferring the complexity of problems to perform a similar 
research for railway systems for other countries. It will be evaluated concerning 
SPADs, that were identified by Kim et al. (2006) as the mostly occurring failure 
scenario in practice. 
Infrastructural and operational parameters 
The following infrastructural and operational parameters present some examples 
with potential of influencing the appearance of human errors. The different 
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evaluated parameters and their type of being influenced are summarized in  
Table 1. Some of the parameters are purely based on infrastructure or operation, 
other parameters are primarily based on one of those two types and secondary on 
the corresponding other type. 
Table 1: Summary of different exemplified parameters 
 
Maximum speed and visibility of the railway line 
Explained by Kim et al. (2006), a SPAD is based on an inadequate track 
observance, in many cases. The speed of a train plays an important role, because 
this influences the time frame that is available for observing the signals located 
beside the track significantly, as a parameter of the visibility. For one specific, 
single signal, the probability of an error can get decreased, if a train drives with 
less speed. Thus, a slower train (e.g. freight train) passes a signal at danger with a 
lower probability, compared with a faster passenger train. This statement is only 
valid for a specific signal of a specific line that is used by both kinds of trains. It 
is not possible to transfer it to other lines, because in normal case, the visibility 
properties vary between each different line. 
If the maximum speed of a train is not determined by the specific train’s properties, 
especially in passenger operation a train normally drives with the maximum line 
speed. In this case, the maximum speed of operation is based on the track 
alignment. Because of centrifugal force specifications it is normally determined 
by the curve radiuses, the corresponding formulas are explained by Matthews 
(2007), for example. A curved alignment can also influence the visibility of a 
railway line. A dead straight railway line that can be operated with high speed 
provides an easy and broad visibility, whereas curved railway lines with lower 
maximum speed allow a larger time frame but less visibility to use it. Thus, a line 
operated with less speed does not necessarily lead to a decreasing probability of 
human errors concerning visibility than a fast line, in any case. 
An optimal significant transfer of human error probabilities is only possible if 
speed and visibility difference compensate each other. Apart from other visibility 
influencing parameters as vegetation for example, a transfer of the results can be 
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made if both infrastructures are used by trains driving with maximum speed 
determined by track alignment or rather with a consistent fractional amount of it. 
As a conclusion, a broad interdependency between speed and visibility can be 
seen. It is qualitatively summarized by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Correlation between speed and line visibility 
 
Station infrastructure 
The station design or rather the clearness of station infrastructure can also 
influence the appearance of human errors. If a station only contains one exit signal 
for each travelling direction, the single signal does not provide potential for being 
mistaken for a signal of a neighboring track. In contrast, especially larger station 
areas may lead to signal mistakes. The probability of appearance will not only 
increase by the complexity of station infrastructure with its number of signals, but 
also by the signal positions. Especially parallel located exit signals may lead to 
mistakes. An even worse case is existent, if the line between a stopping position 
in a station and the exit signal consist of a curve. A corresponding example is 
presented by Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Situation with the potential of mistaking an exit signal of a station 
Mistaking a signal can especially appear, if the exit signal of a neighboring track 
shows a “clear” signal aspect (“green”); the correct signal remains showing the 
“stop” aspect (“red”). In this case, the train driver may consider the signal of the 
neighboring track as valid and accelerates the train. If not recognizing the mistake 
during the process of acceleration, it will lead to a SPAD. 
The interdependency between mistaking a signal and track alignment also shows 
the connection to speed as an influencing parameter and their connection. Speed 
will always play a very important and higher-ranking role, because the time frame 
for recognizing a hazardous situation and the possibility of avoiding an accident 
is mainly influenced by the current speed of a train’s movement. 
Signalling system 
Apart from different signal styles that may cause a different visibility, the potential 
of human error can be dependent on the existence of cabin (inside) or line (outside) 
signals. Using cabin signals, an observance of signals located outside could be 
redundant. That means the visibility of the outside signals and its error potential is 
not remaining any more. It can be assumed that the existence of a cabin signaling 
system increases the correct recognition of signals and their aspects.  
If using a line signal system, the observance of the track and the signals can be 
done synchronized. Cabin signaling leads to a disruption of the line observance, 
because the driver has to shift the attention to the cabin instruments for getting the 
signal information. Thus, the positive aspects of the cabin signaling on safety may 
influence the observance of the track negatively. 
Operational mode 
One possible alternative to a signal-based distance spacing in case of normal 
operation, is the running of trains in a degraded procedure, as the on-sight mode. 
As described in Deutsche Bahn AG (2009), in the network of the German railways, 
on-sight mode is applied in case of signal failures or for doing shunting movements 
within a station area, for example. In the on-sight mode, the train is not protected 
by any signals. That means, the driver has to keep the speed very low, to guarantee 
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a manual stop of the train if recognizing a barrier (for example another train or 
stabled wagons) on its track. In this case, the observance of the track plays a very 
important role. To guarantee an error-free execution of the on-sight mode, the 
maximum speed is restricted to 25 km/h. In general, the application of specific 
driving modes could require a modified task frame. This may also influence the 
occurrence of human errors. Some further general informations about running in 
on-sight mode at the network of German rather US railways are explained by Pachl 
(2002 and 2008). 
Changes of timetable and track allocation 
Changes of the timetable or track allocations as examples for unscheduled events 
can lead to a demand for train driver’s unusual activities. Those activities can be 
connected with a higher stress level, inadequate knowledge how to handle the 
situation or rather a combination of both aspects, leading to an increasing human 
error potential.  
A non-regarded change within the timetable at a stop in a station may lead to an 
untimely departure. A combination of station infrastructure and poor visibility etc. 
(see Figure 2) may lead to a mistaking of signals - especially if a neighboring 
signal switches into the “clear” aspect instead of the valid signal. Similar scenarios 
are possible if a train uses an alternative track unscheduled and its driver assumes 
to be in the usual track. 
Results 
Different examples have shown infrastructural as well as operational parameters 
that may influence the probability of human error appearance. The different 
parameters may affect the size of performance shaping factors. A strict division 
between the several properties is hardly possible, because the parameters may not 
only overlay but also influence each other. For example, the station infrastructure 
can be in context with the track visibility and the maximum speed, concerning the 
error occurrence.  
Transfer of results from one line to other trains of the same line 
Considering the mentioned parameters, a transfer of results from one line to other 
trains of the same line could be possible under specific circumstances. Of course, 
a the transfer within the same line does not lead to a change of infrastructure 
parameters. Thus, the visibility as well as the station infrastructure is constant. An 
ideal transfer of the results is possible, if the following preconditions are fulfilled. 
 
 
• Trains running with same speed 
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00050471 21/03/2013
• Trains using same signaling system (this does not have to purely be 
determined by the infrastructure) 
• Trains using same operational mode 
• No (or same extent of) changes of timetable and track allocation 
 
The more preconditions are not fulfilled, the less significance can be expected 
within the results. 
Transfer of results from one line to trains of another line 
Another possibility is to transfer the results from one line to trains of another line. 
For getting significant results, a maximum amount of preconditions mentioned 
above should also be fulfille. In addition, it has to be considered that apart from 
operational conditions, another line normally features different infrastructural 
properties. Thus, also the following should be considered for getting ideal 
significant results. 
• Line are used with same speed 
• Nearly same visibility conditions 
Exceptional case: Both infrastructures are used by trains driving with maximum 
speed determined by track alignment or rather with a consistent fractional amount 
of it. 
Conclusion 
The paper shows that different parameters of infrastructure and operation may 
influence the human error occurrence. Under specific circumstances it could be 
possible to transfer the results based on a specific railway line with its operational 
constraints to another line or another kind of operation on the same line. In case 
of transfer, the difference between the parameters of reference and evaluating 
conditions should be considered in a first step. This allows an estimation of the 
transferability of the results by calculating its significance.  
The exemplified presented parameters and the discussion of transferring results of 
a selected sample of hazardous events is not only a problem of specific national 
characteristics, but can be found in every railway network. Dependent on 
infrastructure and operation, thus for nation specific properties, parameters may 
vary within their quantity. A detailed quantitative analysis could make sense. 
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